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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Trystan Kyle Krahn appeals the denial of his motion to suppress evidence procured during
a traffic stop, which resulted in charges and his conditional guilty plea for possession of
methamphetamine in violation of Idaho Code § 37-2732.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
On July 1, 2019, Officer Austin Stratton initiated a traffic stop of the vehicle Krahn was
driving after running the license plate, which returned as canceled. (12/13/19 Tr., p. 6, L. 18 – p.
7, L. 20. 1) Officer Stratton could not see a temporary trip permit until he had walked up to the
vehicle, due to the angle of the back windshield. (08/09/19 Tr., p. 14, L. 19 – p. 15, L. 8.) Officer
Stratton questioned Krahn about the temporary tag and requested Krahn’s driver’s license and
proof of insurance. (12/13/19 Tr., p. 8, Ls. 6-23; R., p. 80.) Krahn did not have a driver’s license.
(12/13/19 Tr., p. 9, Ls. 9-12; R., p. 80.) Krahn’s driver’s license was suspended through the State
of Montana. (08/09/19 Tr., p. 7, Ls. 10-16; R., p. 80.) Officer Stratton also questioned Krahn
about two containers in plain view, which he recognized as often used to hold illicit drugs.
(12/13/19 Tr., p. 10, L. 3 – p. 11, L. 11; R., p. 80.) Krahn handed one of the containers to Officer
Stratton, which held two pills. (12/13/19 Tr., p. 10, Ls. 3-8.) Krahn refused to open the second
container upon inquiry, stating that it contained his “vape.” (12/13/19 Tr., p. 10, Ls. 9-12.) When
Krahn “began shaking, sweating, [and] stuttering when asked about [it],” another officer, Deputy
Johnson, who had been present throughout the traffic stop, called for a K-9 unit. (12/13/19 Tr., p.
11, L. 13 – p. 12, L. 7.) The drug dog alerted on Krahn’s vehicle while Officer Stratton was filling
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Because more than one transcript pdf file has been lodged in the appellate record, the state refers
to transcripts by hearing date and cites the internal page and line numbers of the respective hearing.
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out the traffic citations for fictitious plates and driving without privileges. (08/09/19 Tr., p. 8, Ls.
9-15; 12/13/19 Tr., p. 12, L. 21 – p. 13, L. 3; p. 20, L. 21 – p. 21, L. 5; R., p. 81.) After the dog
alerted, Officer Stratton searched the vehicle and opened the second container, which held a clear
glass pipe with white residue, baggies, and about one gram of methamphetamine. (08/09/19 Tr.,
p. 9, L. 11 – p. 10, L. 9; R., p. 81.)
The state charged Krahn with one count of possession of a controlled substance in violation
of Idaho Code § 37-2732, one count of possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of Idaho Code
§ 37-2734A, and one count of driving without privileges in violation of Idaho Code § 18-8001.
(R., pp. 26-27.)
Krahn moved to suppress the methamphetamine and other items discovered in the second
container. (R., pp. 39-42, 76-78.) The district court denied his motion. (R., pp. 79-86.) Krahn
thereafter entered a conditional guilty plea to the first count, reserving his right to appeal the district
court’s decision on his motion to suppress. (R., pp. 91-95.)
Krahn timely appealed. (See
- - R., pp. 109-12, 116-18.)

2

ISSUE
Krahn states the issue on appeal as follows:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Krahn’s motion to suppress?
(Appellant’s brief, p. 6.)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as follows:
Did the district court properly deny Mr. Krahn’s motion to suppress?

3

ARGUMENT
The District Court Properly Denied Krahn’s Motion To Suppress
A.

Introduction
The district court correctly held that the traffic stop was initiated with appropriate

reasonable suspicion arising from the license plates on the vehicle returning as canceled by an
individual other than Krahn. (See Body Cam 2 15:01-15:29; 12/13/19 Tr., p. 6, L. 18 – p. 7, L. 20;
R., pp. 81-82.) This information gave rise to reasonable suspicion of a violation of I.C. §§ 49-428,
49-431, and 49-456, regardless of the presence of a temporary permit in the back windshield. The
questioning regarding drugs and the K-9 unit sweep did not extend the length of the stop because
they occurred while dispatch was inquiring into the reason for Krahn’s driver’s license suspension
and Officer Stratton was filling out the traffic citations respectively. (Body Cam 4:07-16:28;
12/13/19 Tr., p. 10, L. 3 – p. 13, L. 3; R., pp. 81, 83-85.) In the alternative, the questioning
regarding drugs and the drug-dog sniff were supported by reasonable suspicion arising from the
containers in plain sight that Officer Stratton testified were often used to conceal illegal narcotics,
with suspicion increasing as the first container revealed pills, and Krahn began to shake and stutter
when asked about its contents. (12/13/19 Tr., p. 10, L. 3 – p. 13, L.3; R., pp. 84-85.)
Krahn argues that his motion to suppress should have been granted because he had a
temporary registration in his back windshield, which is presumptively valid, and therefore obviated
reasonable suspicion for the stop. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 11-16.) But this argument ignores
key facts—namely that the plates returned canceled and that they returned to an individual other
than Krahn. (See id.; Body Cam 15:01-15:29; 12/13/19 Tr., p. 6, L. 18 – p. 7, L. 20; R., p. 81.)

2

The state refers to Officer Stratton’s body camera footage from the traffic stop as “Body Cam”
and cites to minute and second of the video file.
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Accordingly, Officer Stratton had reasonable suspicion that the plates themselves were fictitious,
canceled, or otherwise in violation of I.C. §§ 49-456, 49-428, and 49-431, regardless of the
temporary permit.
Krahn, assuming that the temporary permit dispelled reasonable suspicion, further
contends that Officer Stratton was required to end the traffic stop immediately upon seeing the
permit. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 15-16.) This argument fails. The permit did not dispel suspicion
that the plates themselves violated the law. And in any event, controlling Idaho case law considers
requests for a motorist’s driver’s license and insurance a legitimate part of a traffic stop whether
or not reasonable suspicion has ended.
B.

Standard of Review
“When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, [the court] accept[s] the trial

court’s findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but [the court] freely review[s]
the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found.” State v. Still, 166 Idaho 351, 458
P.3d 220, 222 (Ct. App. 2019).
“‘Determinations of reasonable suspicion are reviewed de novo[,]’ but ‘must be based on
the totality of the circumstances[.]’” State v. Cook, 165 Idaho 305, 309, 444 P.3d 877, 881 (2019)
(quoting State v. Morgan, 154 Idaho 109, 111, 294 P.3d 1121, 1123 (2013)). “Under the Fourth
Amendment, an officer may stop a vehicle to investigate possible criminal behavior if there is a
reasonable and articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic laws.” State
v. Farrell, 165 Idaho 839, 842, 453 P.3d 273, 276 (Ct. App. 2019). “A determination that
reasonable suspicion exists . . . need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.” United
States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002); State v. Bonner, 167 Idaho 88, 467 P.3d 452, 459
(2020) (reasoning that reasonable suspicion need not rule out innocent conduct). “[A]n officer
5

may take into account his experience and law enforcement training in drawing inferences from
facts gathered.” State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 410, 283 P.3d 722, 727 (2012).
“The interpretation of a statute is a question of law [the] Court reviews de novo.” State v.
Smalley, 164 Idaho 780, 783, 435 P.3d 1100, 1103 (2019).
C.

The District Court Correctly Held That The Stop Was Validly Initiated, And Krahn Does
Not Argue Otherwise
1.

The Traffic Stop Was Properly Initiated With Reasonable Suspicion That The
License Plates Were Fictitious Or Canceled In Violation Of I.C. § 49-456(3)

Improper display of registration or license plates gives rise to reasonable suspicion. See,
e.g., I.C. § 49-456(3) (providing that it is unlawful for any person “[t]o display or cause or permit
to be displayed, or to have in possession any registration card or license plate knowing the same
to be fictitious or to have been canceled, revoked, suspended or altered”); I.C. § 49-431(1)
(requiring that registration card and license plates of a vehicle conveyed to a new owner “remain
with and in the possession of the transferor”); I.C. § 49-428(1) (“License plates shall be displayed
during the current registration year.”); State v. Martin, 148 Idaho 31, 37-38, 218 P.3d 10, 16-17
(Ct. App. 2009) (affirming denial of motion to suppress because officer had reasonable suspicion
arising from defendant’s license plate hanging at a thirty-degree angle).
And when registration information conflicts with what the officer observes of the vehicle,
reasonable suspicion exists that the vehicle displays fictitious plates or otherwise is in violation of
I.C. § 49-456(3). See, e.g., State v. Geissler, 134 Idaho 902, 905, 11 P.3d 1120, 1123 (Ct. App.
2000) (reasonable suspicion of fictitious plates due to make of vehicle not matching registration
information); State v. Creel, No. 38658, 2012 WL 9494147, at *2 (Ct. App. Aug. 7, 2012)
(reasonable suspicion when color of truck did not match color listed in registration); State v.
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Armstrong, No. 34420, 2009 WL 9146284, at *2-3 (Ct. App. Feb. 17, 2009) (reasonable suspicion
when license plate returned not registered to anyone).
Officer Stratton properly initiated the traffic stop with reasonable suspicion that Krahn was
driving with “fictitious” or “canceled” plates in violation of I.C. § 49-456(3). Before Officer
Stratton pulled Krahn over, he had run the license plates on the vehicle Krahn was driving, which
came back as “canceled.” 3 (12/13/19 Tr., p. 6, L. 18 – p. 7, L. 20.) The plates were canceled by
a person named Anna Verado from Caldwell. (Body Cam 15:01-15:29.) Accordingly, there was
reasonable suspicion that Krahn was violating Idaho Code § 49-456(3) on two bases—that the
plates were canceled and that the plates were fictitious because they related to an owner who was
obviously not Krahn. See Geissler, 134 Idaho at 905, 11 P.3d at 1123 (reasonable suspicion due
to license plate not matching registration information); Creel, 2012 WL 9494147, at *2 (reasonable
suspicion when color of truck did not match color listed in registration); Armstrong, 2009 WL
9146284, at *2-3 (reasonable suspicion when license plate returned not registered to anyone);

3

In the district court’s findings of fact, the court states that the license plate had returned “expired”
rather than “canceled.” (R., p. 79.) It appears that the discrepancy occurred because defense
counsel referred to the plates as “expired.” (See R., p. 40; 12/13/19 Tr., p. 15, L. 25 – p. 16, L. 2.)
But the evidence itself—Officer Stratton’s testimony and dispatch’s report in the body camera
footage—repeatedly demonstrates the plates had not expired but rather had been canceled by
another individual. (12/13/19 Tr., p. 6, Ls. 18-21; p. 7, Ls. 17-18; p. 8, Ls. 2-4; p. 16, L. 3; Body
Cam 15:01-15:29.)
Alternatively, the district court may have been using the word “expired” interchangeably
with “canceled.” (See R., p. 82 (quoting I.C. § 49-456(3) language related to “canceled” plates
and stating that the statute “makes it unlawful to display the expired license plate”). The appellate
court may interpret imprecise wording to be consistent with the reasoning of the district court’s
opinion. See Caldwell Land & Cattle, LLC v. Johnson Thermal Sys., Inc., 165 Idaho 787, 452
P.3d 809 (2019) (“While this ruling is not altogether incorrect, the phrasing is imprecise.
Considering the entirety of the district court’s decision, it appears the district court meant to
construe the leasehold as a month-to-month periodic tenancy.”).
To the extent this Court finds it necessary to its decision to find clear error to consider the
license plates “canceled,” the state contends the error is clear and requests that the Court affirm on
that basis.
7

Bonner, 167 Idaho 88, 467 P.3d at 459 (reasonable suspicion need not rule out innocent conduct);
Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277 (same).
2.

Alternatively, The Traffic Stop Was Properly Initiated With Reasonable Suspicion
That The License Plates Remained On A Transferred Vehicle In Violation Of I.C.
§ 49-431(1)

The fact that the plates returned to an individual who was not Krahn (12/13/19 Tr., p. 6, L.
18 – p. 7, L. 20; Body Cam 15:01-15:29), also gave rise to reasonable suspicion that Krahn was
violating I.C. § 49-431. Idaho Code § 49-431 requires in relevant part that when vehicle title is
transferred, “the registration card and license plate shall remain with the transferor.” I.C. § 49431(1). If the vehicle Krahn was driving had been recently transferred, which could explain the
plates returning to an individual who was not Krahn, the statute required that the plates be removed.
See id. Thus, there was additional reasonable suspicion that the plates violated I.C. § 49-431.
3.

Alternatively, The Traffic Stop Was Properly Initiated With Reasonable Suspicion
That The License Plates Were Expired In Violation Of I.C. § 49-428(1)

As explained in footnote 3 above, the license plates were “canceled.” If, however, the
license plates are treated as “expired,” as Krahn seeks, there was still reasonable suspicion to
initiate the stop. Officer Stratton had reasonable suspicion that Krahn was violating I.C. § 49-428
because the plates were not then-currently registered. Idaho Code § 49-428(1) provides in relevant
part, “License plates shall be displayed during the current registration year.” Statutory language
must be interpreted so as not to render any language void or superfluous. Smalley, 164 Idaho at
784, 435 P.3d at 1104. The words “during the current registration year” modifies the mandate to
display license plates to instruct when “[l]icense plates shall be displayed.” See I.C. § 49-428.
Accordingly, when plates are not currently registered, they should not be displayed. To require
(or allow) license plates to always be displayed, whether or not they were registered, would render
the words “during the current registration year” void or superfluous. Accordingly, even if the
8

plates are deemed expired, there was reasonable suspicion at the time of the stop because I.C.
§ 49-428 required their removal. 4
D.

The Temporary Permit Is Not Material
1.

Officer Stratton Seeing An Apparently Valid Temporary Permit Did Not End
Reasonable Suspicion

The temporary permit, which Officer Stratton first saw when walking up to Krahn’s vehicle
after pulling him over, did not dispel suspicion. (08/09/19 Tr., p. 14, L. 19 – p. 15, L. 8; 12/13/19
Tr., p. 7, L. 22 – p. 8, L. 8; R., p. 79.) The license plate itself violated the law, regardless of any
temporary permit. (See supra Part C.1 – C.3.) And the presence of canceled (or expired) plates
was inconsistent with the presence of a temporary permit because they were two different
registrations associated with different owners.

(See Body Cam 15:01-15:29, 34:51-35:02;

12/13/19 Tr., p. 6, L. 18 – p. 7, L. 20; R., p. 81.)
2.

Even If Seeing The Temporary Permit Meant Reasonable Suspicion Ended, Officer
Stratton Could Still Request Krahn’s Driver’s License And Insurance Information

The officer may request the driver’s information, even if upon stopping the vehicle,
reasonable suspicion is dispelled. See State v. Reed, 129 Idaho 503, 506, 927 P.2d 893, 896 (Ct.
App. 1996) (holding officer could request driver’s license and proof of insurance even though
upon approaching the vehicle he noticed the temporary permit) (citing State v. Godwin, 121 Idaho
491, 495, 826 P.2d 452, 456 (1992)). In other words, the officer is not required to abandon the
traffic stop without explaining to the driver why he has been stopped or requesting identification.
State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647, 653, 51 P.3d 461, 467 (Ct. App. 2002).

Requesting

identification and proof of insurance is a “legitimate part of a traffic stop” even after reasonable

4

Further, “expired” plates displayed on a vehicle are fictitious under I.C. § 49-456(3) because their
display implies that they are currently registered, although they are not.
9

suspicion has ended. Id. Obtaining the driver’s information, among other things, allows the officer
to accurately prepare any required reports related to the contact with the motorist. Id.
Thus, even if a temporary permit somehow dispelled suspicion, Officer Stratton could ask
Krahn for his driver’s license, registration, and insurance information. See Reed, 129 Idaho at
506, 927 P.2d at 896. When Officer Stratton requested these documents, Krahn admitted that he
did not have his driver’s license, initiating further reasonable suspicion for driving without
privileges. (12/13/19 Tr., p. 8, Ls. 6-23; R., p. 80.)
E.

The District Court Correctly Held That The Stop Was Not Improperly Extended
“In the context of traffic stops, authority for the seizure ends when the tasks related to the

infraction are, or reasonably should have been, completed.” Still, 166 Idaho 351, 458 P.3d at 223
(citing Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005)). “Such tasks include ordinary inquiries
incident to the traffic stop such as checking the driver’s license, determining whether there are
outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of
insurance.” Id. (citing Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 355 (2015)).
“An officer’s inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop … do
not convert the encounter into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do
not measurably extend the duration of the stop.” Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009)
(citing Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 100-01 (2005)). While the officer is waiting on the
information relating to the traffic stop investigation, he may question regarding an unrelated
subject because such questioning does not prolong the duration of the stop. See State v. Renteria,
163 Idaho 545, 548-49, 415 P.3d 954, 957-58 (Ct. App. 2018) (affirming denial of motion to
suppress when officer asked about drugs and weapons while defendant was in the process of
searching for proof of insurance). The Fourth Amendment has a reasonableness standard; it does
10

not require that an officer conduct a traffic stop “as fast as humanly possible.” Still, 166 Idaho
351, 458 P.3d at 225 (Ct. App. 2019).
“Although a drug-dog sniff cannot fairly be characterized as part of the officer’s traffic
mission, it is well-established that a drug-dog sniff conducted during a lawful traffic stop is
constitutionally permissible if it is executed in a reasonable manner and does not itself infringe
upon a constitutionally protected privacy interest.” Id. (citing Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409-10). This
means that a drug-dog sniff must be conducted concurrently with the “reasonably diligent”
execution of the traffic mission. See State v. Linze, 161 Idaho 605, 609, 389 P.3d 150, 154 (2016).
Or if the drug-dog sniff is conducted after the traffic mission has ended or been abandoned, there
must be independent reasonable suspicion to justify it. Still, 166 Idaho 351, 458 P.3d at 223 (citing
Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355).
1.

Questions While Waiting For Information From Dispatch Did Not Extend The Stop

As detailed below, Officer Stratton did not prolong the traffic stop because he inquired
about drugs while waiting for dispatch to investigate the reason for Krahn’s driver’s license
suspension. See Renteria, 163 Idaho at 548-49, 415 P.3d at 957-58 (stop not extended when officer
asked about drugs and weapons while defendant was searching for proof of insurance). Officer
Stratton began the traffic stop by appropriately investigating the suspected driving infraction.
(Body Cam 0:31-5:54; R., p. 80.) Krahn extended the time required for this inquiry owing to the
fact that he had no driver’s license on him and verbally gave some of his information to Officer
Stratton, which the officer then relayed to dispatch. (See Body Cam 0:31-3:40; 12/13/19 Tr., p. 9,
Ls. 9-12; R., p. 80.) Dispatch reported that Krahn’s driver’s license was suspended through the
state of Montana but could not immediately determine why the license was suspended. (Body

11

Cam 3:30-4:12; R., p. 80.) Dispatch then told Officer Stratton to “stand by” while dispatch
inquired into the reason for the suspension. (Body Cam 4:07-4:12; R., p. 80.)
While dispatch was inquiring, Officer Stratton returned to Krahn’s vehicle and questioned
Krahn about the suspension. (Body Cam 4:07-5:54; R., p. 80.) He and Deputy Johnson noticed a
small orange and blue container that they recognized as commonly containing narcotics. (Body
Cam 6:27-6:39; 12/13/19 Tr., p. 10, L. 3 – p. 11, L. 11; R., p. 80.) Officer Stratton questioned
Krahn about the container. (Body Cam 6:41-7:54; 12/13/19 Tr., p. 10, Ls. 3-8; R., p. 80.) Krahn
opened the container, which contained two pills. (Id.) Krahn stated that one was Viagra, and the
other was for “anxiety,” but he did not know what exactly it was. (Body Cam 6:41-7:54; R., p.
80.) Officer Stratton asked Krahn his age, and he answered “

.” (Body Cam 6:50-

6:58.) Officer Stratton saw a black container in plain view that he recognized as commonly used
to conceal narcotics and questioned Krahn about it. (Body Cam 7:55-8:02; 12/13/19 Tr., p. 10,
Ls. 9-12; R., p. 80.) Krahn refused to open the container, stating that it held his “vape pen” and
then growing agitated when Officer Stratton continued to question him about it. (Body Cam 7:5511:46; 12/13/19 Tr., p. 10, Ls. 11-12; p. 11, L. 13 – p. 12, L. 2.) Deputy Johnson called for a K-9
unit while Officer Stratton returned to the police car to fill out the citations for fictitious plates and
driving without privileges. (08/09/19 Tr., p. 8, Ls. 9-15; 12/13/19 Tr., p. 12, Ls. 3-10; p. 20, L. 21
– p. 21, L. 5; R., p. 81.) Dispatch then reported that Krahn had two prior “insurance convictions,”
which dispatch believed to be the reason for the driver’s license suspension. (See
- - Body Cam
11:57-13:09.) Officer Stratton had to collect more information from Krahn verbally (address,
height, weight, hair color, eye color) and request the driver’s license number from dispatch. (Body
Cam 13:10-15:01.) While Officer Stratton was still in the process of gathering information and
filling out the citations, the drug dog arrived and alerted on Krahn’s vehicle. (Body Cam 15:02-
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16:28; 12/13/19 Tr., p. 12, Ls. 21-24; p. 21, Ls. 3-5; R., p. 81.) Officer Stratton conducted a search
of the vehicle, opening the black container, which contained methamphetamine and paraphernalia.
(Body Cam 16:30-18:28; 08/09/19 Tr., p. 9, L. 19 – p. 10, L. 9; R., p. 81.)
Accordingly, the stop was not extended by questioning about drugs or the K-9 unit sweep.
The length of the stop was determined by the amount of time it took to investigate Krahn’s driver’s
license suspension and to fill out the driving citations.
2.

Even If The Stop Were Prolonged, The Extension Was Proper Because It Was
Independently Supported By Reasonable Suspicion

Even if the stop were prolonged by the questioning about drugs, there was reasonable
suspicion to support the questioning about drugs and the drug dog sniff. Reasonable suspicion of
illegal drug offenses can arise from the officer’s recognition of a common method of hiding drugs,
the implausible explanations of the defendant, or unidentified pills. See United States v. Johnson,
428 F. Supp. 3d 655, 674-75 (D.N.M. 2019) (holding search of defendant’s bag was valid when
officer saw a black bundle in the bag and recognized that illegal narcotics are often bundled inside
clothing); United States v. Malik, 963 F.3d 1014, 1016 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding probable cause
existed that defendant had used marijuana while driving based on defendant first saying he had
last smoked marijuana six or seven hours before the traffic stop, then changing the story to smoking
three or four hours earlier); United States v. Phillips, CR 18-31-BLG-SPW, 2019 WL 2270562, at
*1 (D. Mont. May 28, 2019) (holding reasonable suspicion arose from defendant’s possession of
an unmarked pill bottle containing Adderall, for which defendant did not have a prescription). A
defendant’s change in demeanor in response to a specific question may also contribute to
reasonable suspicion. See State v. Grantham, 146 Idaho 490, 497, 198 P.3d 128, 135 (Ct. App.
2008) (affirming denial of motion to suppress and reasoning that defendant’s change in demeanor
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when asked about methamphetamine contributed to officer’s reasonable suspicion of drug
possession).
Here, Officer Stratton observed that the containers in plain view in Krahn’s vehicle were a
type commonly used to hold controlled substances. This provided reasonable suspicion to prolong
the stop and question Krahn about drugs. See Johnson, 428 F. Supp. 3d at 674-75 (search of bag
was valid when officer recognized in the bag a bundling of clothing commonly used to hide drugs);
Danney, 153 Idaho at 410, 283 P.3d at 727 (“[A]n officer may take into account his experience
and law enforcement training in drawing inferences from facts gathered.”). Officer Stratton kept
his questions narrowly tailored to the basis of his suspicion—the containers. (See Body Cam 6:4111:46; 12/13/19 Tr., p. 10, Ls. 3-12; R., p. 80.) He asked Krahn about the orange container first,
which Krahn opened, revealing two unidentified pills, causing further suspicion. (Body Cam 6:418:12; 12/13/19 Tr., p. 10, Ls. 3-8; R., p. 80; see Phillips, 2019 WL 2270562, at *1 (reasonable
suspicion from defendant’s possession of unmarked bottle of prescription pills)). And Krahn’s
explanation of the pills only added to Officer Stratton’s suspicion. See Malik, 963 F.3d at 1016
(implausible explanations may give rise to reasonable suspicion). Krahn stated that he was
years old and had a Viagra pill and could not identify the second pill. (Body Cam 6:41-7:54;
R., p. 80.) Krahn stated that the second pill was prescribed for anxiety, but he did not produce a
prescription. (See Body Cam 6:59-7:54; R., p. 80.) Krahn’s demeanor also changed when asked
about the second container. (12/13/19 Tr., p. 11, L. 13 – p. 12, L. 5 (Krahn’s “demeanor once
asked about the black case in the passenger seat” changed; he “began shaking, sweating, stuttering
when asked about that”); Grantham, 146 Idaho at 497, 198 P.3d at 135 (defendant’s change in
demeanor when asked about methamphetamine contributed to officer’s reasonable suspicion of
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drug possession).) All these facts built a mounting suspicion that Krahn had committed a drug
offense.
The K-9 unit was requested at that point, and the drug dog alerted on Krahn’s vehicle.
(12/13/19 Tr., p. 11, L. 13 – p. 13, L. 3.) The alert provided probable cause to search. See State
v. Brumfield, 136 Idaho 913, 921, 42 P.3d 706, 714 (Ct. App. 2001) (“It is . . . well settled that
once a drug canine alerts on a car, the police have probable cause to conduct a warrantless search
of the vehicle.”).
F.

Krahn’s Arguments Fail
Krahn argues that there was no reasonable suspicion for Officer Stratton to initiate the

traffic stop because I.C. § 49-456(3) does not apply to “his expired license plate.” (Appellant’s
brief, pp. 9-10.) It appears that Krahn bases this argument on the fact that the language of I.C.
§ 49-456(3) does not contain the word “expired.” (See Appellant’s brief, p. 11; I.C. § 49-456(3)
(prohibiting knowing display of registration card or license plates that are “fictitious or . . .
canceled, revoked, suspended or altered”).) But Krahn is wrong. The statute applies because the
plates were “fictitious,” a term included in the statute. See supra Part C.1, C.3. While Krahn
makes much of the trial court’s use of the word “expired” rather than “canceled,” the usage does
not change the outcome here. See supra Part C.1-C.3.
Krahn’s argument that the temporary registration was presumptively legal and therefore
dispelled suspicion (Appellant’s brief, pp. 11-16), depends on the assumption that the only thing
Officer Stratton initially perceived to be suspicious was that the license plates were “expired.”
This is incorrect for all the reasons explained above. See supra Part C. Further, the cases on which
Krahn relies (Salois and Cook), (Appellant’s brief, pp. 14-15), do not involve the circumstances
presented here. In both Salois and Cook, the vehicles had no license plates and displayed a
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temporary permit. 144 Idaho at 346, 160 P.3d at 1281; 165 Idaho at 307, 444 P.3d at 879. Here,
Krahn did not drive a vehicle lacking license plates; he drove a vehicle displaying canceled (or
expired) plates that themselves violated Idaho driving statutes. See supra Part C.
Finally, Krahn argues that State v. Reed, 129 Idaho 503, 927 P.2d 893 (Ct. App. 1996) “no
longer has any precedential value on the legality of prolonged traffic stops” due to the later
decisions Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015), and State v. Linze, 161 Idaho 605, 389
P.3d 150 (2016). (Appellant’s brief, pp. 15-16, n.15.) Krahn is mistaken. Reed holds that an
officer may ask a motorist for his driver’s license, even after reasonable suspicion has been
dispelled, because asking for a driver’s license is a necessary part of the traffic stop and allows the
officer to complete reports. See 129 Idaho at 505-07, 927 P.2d at 895-97. Rodriguez and Linze
relate to whether investigation that is unrelated to the traffic stop (like investigating potential drug
offenses) unlawfully prolongs detention under the Fourth Amendment. 575 U.S. at 354-57
(contrasting the traffic stop-related inquiries including checking driver’s license, registration, and
proof of insurance, with the crime detection-related measure of a drug dog sniff); 161 Idaho at
609, 389 P.3d at 154 (holding unconstitutional the drug dog sweep that delayed traffic stop by two
and a half minutes). Accordingly, Rodriguez and Linze do nothing to disturb the holding in Reed,
which relates to questions that are necessarily part of the traffic stop (asking for the motorist’s
driver’s license and proof of insurance).
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the denial of Krahn’s motion to
suppress.
DATED this 16th day of April, 2021.
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